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Only recently the Sino-Taiwanese issue has again been in the headlines of the international 
media. On Saturday, 3 August 2002, Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian insisted in a 
passionate speech that there is ‘one country on each side’ of the Taiwan Strait. He went 
even further by calling for new legislation that would allow a referendum to be held on 
changing the island’s current international status, saying that this would be a ‘basic human 
right’ (J. Gittings, ‘Independence Call by Taiwan Risks war, Warns China’, The Guardian 
[6 August 2002]). Chen’s remarks resulted in a furious response from the mainland. 
Although the conflict between Beijing and Taipei can be interpreted as a legacy of the 
Chinese Civil War, the tensions gained in intensity during the 1990s. The following article 
suggests that the linkages and dynamics between the globalisation process and international 
security are increasingly important for a better understanding of the development 
of relations at the international level in general and in the China–Taiwan conflict in 
particular. 
Globalisation and international security have been prominent topics in the academic 
literature on international relations in the post-Cold-War world. However, until recently the 
linkages between the two concepts have been under-researched. But it is precisely this 
connection which is crucial for a better understanding of the developments and dynamics 
of conflicts at the international level. The globalisation process has a variety of effects on 
the domestic and foreign realities that national governments face and therefore influences 
the security environment of inter-state relations. 
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it aims to contribute to the general 
discussion surrounding the concept of globalisation and its consequences for international 
security and inter-state relations. And, secondly, it attempts to offer a deeper insight into 
the complexities of security relations across the Taiwan Strait by connecting them to the 
globalisation process. In order to achieve these goals the discussion is divided into two 
categories. The first section establishes definitional clarity of the notion of globalisation and 
its implications for national governance and, consequently, national and international 
security. The second section argues that the globalisation process is having a decisive 
impact on the development of the conflict between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
and the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC). Depending on the definition of globalisation 
it is possible to claim that forces associated with the globalisation process have become 
increasingly significant factors of international relations in the post-Cold-War world. 
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Moreover, in this period the Sino-Taiwanese conflict has gained in intensity and magnitude. 
This leads to the assumption of an association between the globalisation process and the 
development of international security across the Taiwan Strait. The article scrutinises the 
effects of globalisation on the domestic situations in the PRC and Taiwan. Of particular 
interest in that context is the formation of a Taiwanese identity. Therefore, it is important 
to mention the constructivist tradition which has been largely responsible for bringing 
identity issues to light in international relations theory—something that neither liberalism 
nor realism has done before in a satisfactory manner. The article concludes by outlining the 
impact of globalisation on PRC–ROC relations. The linkage between the domestic and the 
international level is illustrated by two scenarios utilising the analytical instruments offered 
by the neorealist and neoliberal schools of thought in order to demonstrate the impact of 
globalisation on international security across the spectrum of theoretical debate. The 
scenarios serve demonstrative purposes only. The article does not aim to enter the 
long-lasting debate between proponents of neoliberalism and neorealism. 
Globalisation, National Governance and International Security 
The current international environment is characterised by a multitude of forces. Among 
them those which can be attributed to the globalisation process and its consequences are of 
crucial importance for the development, politics and analysis of inter-state relations. 
However, the term ‘globalisation’ has been used so often in academic circles, political 
rhetoric and the daily press that it has become a hollow catchphrase. Therefore, the first part 
of the paper attempts to establish definitional clarity of the concept and its effects 
on national governance and international security. However, an extensive discussion is 
deliberately avoided, since this topic covers fairly familiar ground for every student of 
international relations. 
The academic literature offers an amazing variety of different approaches and theories 
concerning the notion of globalisation. Almost every researcher in the social sciences seems 
to have something to add to the ongoing discourse. Jan Art Scholte presents the dilemma 
by offering a brief collection of definitions.1 They represent a number of contrasting views ranging from 
defining globalisation as the development of a global society, emphasising the rising internationalisation of 
production 
and capital, or the international division of labour, to a focus on issues such as transnational 
migration or external environment effects. Some critics regard globalisation as a misconception 
altogether. In their eyes, globalisation is something of a myth, created by neoliberals 
in order to foster the spread of capitalism and to obscure the suppression of local cultures 
and the ‘Americanisation’ of the international political economy.2 This highlights the 
contradictions and confusions surrounding the concept. Globalisation, it seems, means 
different things to different people. This makes it even more necessary to clarify the 
terminology when dealing with such a notion. Perhaps one of the most constructive 
definitions has been offered by David Held. According to him and other scholars, 
globalisation can be interpreted as a multidimensional and multifaceted process that is 
changing the very nature of political, social and economic relations.3 It is a term describing 
1 J. A. Scholte, ‘The Globalization of World Politics’, in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds), The Globalization of World 
Politics–An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 15. 
2 The sceptical thesis makes a contrast between globalisation and the intensification of international trade. See P. Hirst, G. Thompson, 
Globalisation in Question: The 
International Economy and Possibilities of Governance, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); P. Hirst, ‘The 
Global Economy: Myths and Realities’, International Affairs, 73 (1997); D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and 
J. Perraton, Global Transformations–Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 5. 
3 See J. Krause, ‘Overview’, in Council for Asia—Europe Cooperation, Strengthening International Order–The 
Role of Asia—Europe Co-operation (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), p. 10. See also D. 
Held, ‘Democracy and Globalization’, MPIfG Working Paper 97/5 (1997), p. 2, http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/ 
pu/workpap/wp97–5/wp97–5.html. Accessed 19 September 2001. 
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certain trends, factors and forces that share a transnational nature and penetrate all levels 
of international relations. This is a rather broad definition. Since globalisation is such a 
highly controversial subject, it is difficult to capture and to measure it. However, the 
suggested definition allows the identification of several distinctive indicators of the 
globalisation process: 
 Globalisation extends social, political and economic activities across political frontiers. 
 It intensifies international interdependence as flows of trade, investment, finance, 
migration and culture increase. 
 It speeds up the world, since new systems of transport and communication mean that 
people, goods and capital travel much faster and the diffusion of societies and cultures 
by information and new ideas is more rapid and more difficult to control. 
 Local developments in far-away places can have enormous global consequences.4 
Thus, the phenomenon of globalisation involves an increase in transnational activities and 
interactions in several domains, which can be divided into economic, political, environmental, 
technological, military and cultural spheres.5 Consequently it is possible to argue that 
there are several types of globalisation which are related to transnational activities in the 
aforementioned areas. 
It is important to note that globalisation is qualitatively different from interdependence. 
While enhanced interdependencies are undoubtedly part of the globalisation process, 
globalisation goes much further than interdependence. Interdependence focuses on the 
increase of linkages between different sovereign entities. Globalisation, however, generates 
the penetration of previously sovereign space. Therefore it includes not only the movement 
of goods and capital but also the circulation and interpenetration of cultures, societies, 
peoples and ideas.6 These dynamics are causing many structural changes, including the 
rethinking of the role of national governments.7 Increasing international interdependence 
and the penetration of sovereign space by outside forces challenge traditional modes of 
governance. 
Since the establishment of the Westphalian system the nation-state has provided the 
major framework of political organisation for the exercise of national governance. One of 
its main features is the link between sovereignty and territoriality. 
… sovereign states rooted in territorial notions of social space have been the prime unit for 
facilitating, impeding and mediating interaction between the social groups, organisations, and 
citizens and other categories of collective and individual social units contained within their 
borders.8 
Yet globalisation increasingly puts the effectiveness of territorial governance based on 
exclusive national sovereignty in question. Hence, a crucial precondition for successful 
governance at state level has been removed. National governments are increasingly unable 
to control multinational companies, ecological problems, international crime and terrorism 
or currency speculations efficiently, since these activities lack a territorial foundation. 
Globalisation is not an entirely new phenomenon. International transactions are as old 
4 D.Held, A. McGrew,D.Goldblatt and J. Perraton, ‘Managing the Challenge of Globalization and Institutionalizing 
Cooperation through Global Governance’, in C. W. Kegley, Jr and E. R. Wittkopf (eds), TheGlobal Agenda–Issues 
and Perspectives (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), p. 135. 
5 Held, ‘Democracy and Globalization’, p. 2. 
6 J.-M. Guehenno, ‘The Impact of Globalisation on Strategy’, Survival, 40,4 (1999). 
7 See R. G. Lipsey, ‘Globalisation and National Government Policies: An Economist’s View’, in J. H. Dunning 
(ed.), Governments, Globalisation and International Business (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 73. 
8 C.W. Hughes, ‘Globalisation and Security in the Asia—Pacific: An Initial Investigation’, University of Warwick, 
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Working Paper No. 61/00 (2000), p. 5. 
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as the nation-state concept itself and nation-states have never been detached from their 
external environment.9 But due to restricted technological capabilities these kinds of 
transactions were of a rather limited nature compared with today and could be more easily 
controlled by national administrations.10 It is not the very existence of international 
activities but their extensiveness, their intensity, their velocity and the corresponding effects 
on society which create problems for the nation-state. 
Of particular interest for the interpretation of the events across the Taiwan Strait in the 
post-Cold-War world are the security implications of the globalisation process. In this 
context it is important to mention the narrowing of the gap between exclusively domestic 
and exclusively foreign policies. The forces and characteristics of the globalisation process 
make such a distinction increasingly difficult. National governments are forced to contend 
with a freer flow of economic, social, political and cultural dynamics which move with 
declining reference to the previous limitations and channels imposed by national borders.11 
The security implications of globalisation are threefold. First, as already indicated, national 
and international affairs become increasingly mixed and so are matters of internal and 
external security. Second, globalisation leads to a diversification of security threats and the 
creation of new security actors. And, third, globalisation results in a enhanced pronouncement 
of identity issues.12 
Among the far-reaching effects of transnational political, economic and social activities, 
enhanced interdependence and the development of new and faster means of communication 
and transportation are the creation of new actors and new potential threats to the external 
and internal security of a nation-state. The dilemma arising out of globalisation for national 
governance was demonstrated by the devastating attacks on the World Trade Centre in New 
York on 11 September 2001. This traumatic event and the resulting crisis underlined the 
incapacity of even a state as powerful and technologically advanced as the United States to 
tackle independently a collective problem such as international terrorism. The enormous 
military power of the United States seems to be of limited use against an invisible and 
fragmented enemy with no territory of its own, thus defying conventional warfare. 
Retaliation and, therefore, sufficient deterrence are almost impossible without a target. The 
economic aftershock has been felt around the world. The struggle of the aviation industry 
in the aftermath of the attack is just one example and points to the indicators of 
globalisation as defined above: the effects of certain significant events will be felt in almost 
every region of the planet. 
Economic globalisation has security consequences. Commerce and financial operations 
easily penetrate state borders. According to neoliberal arguments the spread of market 
forces is a precondition for economic development and growth. On the international level 
globalisation has the potential to facilitate a more peaceful environment due to the 
increasing interconnectedness of different national economies. However, economic factors 
can also have disintegrative effects and threaten the internal stability of a state and a 
society. On the national level, the opening of a society to the forces of international 
economics affects the welfare of different groups within the state. The downside of that is 
that the gains of economic development are seldom spread evenly. While some social and 
economic actors are benefiting, others will lose out. This kind of economic exclusion and 
disparity can result in social unrest and internal instability which affects the foreign policy 
behaviour of the state. Accordingly, domestic instability can translate into international 
9 And so are the problems for the nation-state caused by powerful transnational actors such as, for instance, the 
East India Company. 
10 In addition, the spread of globalisation was effectively limited by the Cold War dichotomy. 
11 See Hughes, ‘Globalisation and Security in the Asia—Pacific’, p. 5. 
12 See V. D. Cha, ‘Globalization and the Study of International Security’, Journal of Peace Research, 37,3 (2000). 
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tensions. Possible reasons for that could be spillover effects such as migration and ethnic 
violence or simple diversion tactics employed by national regimes seeking legitimacy in 
nationalism and military adventures abroad. International competition caused by the 
globalisation process can also become a security problem. Some states will simply do better 
than others. The outcome of unmanaged competition can result in corruption and organised 
crime at the national level and the possibility of protectionism, arms races and the threat 
of military violence at the international level. 
Environmental problems deserve also to be mentioned in this context. Environmental 
degradation such as global warming, ozone depletion, acid rain, pollution and so on have 
to be taken into account as possible security risks, since they are able to threaten the health 
of individuals and populations. The haze in Southeast Asia is a good example of that. The 
forest fires in Indonesia of 1997 had a devastating impact on the neighbouring countries. 
According to the Malaysian government, approximately 15,000 people had to be admitted 
to hospitals and clinics due to respiratory illness in 1997 alone. In December of the same 
year, the state of Sarawak was forced to declare a state of emergency, closing schools, 
businesses and government services for ten days. In addition, the haze brought significant 
losses to the tourism industries in Malaysia and Singapore.13 
The developments in the information technology sector have dramatically enhanced the 
speed and size of international data flows. Via the internet and the mass media ideas, news, 
facts and propaganda travel faster and penetrate societies far more easily than ever before. 
These increased information and data flows are much more difficult for national authorities 
to control, if only because of the overload of incoming material or the technical problems 
of effective control and monitoring. Like the other indicators, this feature of globalisation 
can have disintegrative effects on the national and consequently the international level. 
Crime syndicates, terrorist networks, ethnic militias, paramilitary guerrillas and religious 
groups employing these new means of communication and transport are presenting new 
dimensions of security threat. Another possibility is the triggering of a reorientation of the 
loyalties of different subnational actors and the subsequent erosion of the collective identity 
of a society, resulting in the internal fragmentation of a state. 
The Globalisation Process and Its Security Implications for Cross-Strait 
Relations 
Now we have established the connection between the globalisation process, national 
governance and international security, the second part of the paper will analyse the 
implications of globalisation for the relations between the PRC and the ROC. The Taiwan 
Strait provides an interesting case study of the linkages between globalisation issues and 
inter-state relations. In this context it needs to be pointed out that while the tensions 
between the mainland and Taiwan date back to the late 1940s it can be argued that for most 
of the intervening time the conflict was constrained by superpower rivalry and, to a certain 
extent, even ritualised. It appears, however, that the dispute has been intensified and gained 
magnitude since the late 1980s. It is also roughly within that period that the forces of 
globalisation have become increasingly significant in international relations. 
Assuming a strong linkage between these developments, the next two sections analyse 
the implications of globalisation for the domestic situations in China and Taiwan. The 
remainder of the article will then demonstrate the potential of domestic developments 
affected by forces associated with the globalisation process to influence the security 
relations across the Taiwan Strait. 
13 R. Sukma, ‘Security and Interdependence in Southeast Asia: View from Jakarta’, Strategi, 7 (August 1999), p. 48. 
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China—Domestic Fragility 
By the 1970s the Chinese leadership had arrived at the conclusion that Maoist economic 
policies had failed utterly and had led to some of the worst crises in modern Chinese 
history, such as the catastrophic aftermath of the so-called ‘Great Leap Forward’. The death 
of Mao Tse-tung in 1976 opened the way for economic reorganisation and the Chinese 
government began to enact a reform programme by opening the country to the international 
economy and therefore to the forces of economic globalisation.14 The domestic reforms 
were implemented gradually or as experiments—as the Chinese say, by ‘feeling the stones 
across the river’.15 At first glance, the benefits have been breathtaking. In 2000, the PRC 
was the seventh biggest export nation and the eighth largest importer in the world. Exports 
and imports together were worth more than a staggering US$470 billion.16 From 1979 to 
1999, China’s GDP grew at an average rate of 9.7 per cent, making it one of the 
fastest-growing countries.17 Furthermore, infant mortality and life expectancy are nowadays 
comparable to those of many high income countries.18 A variety of domestic and foreign 
factors have been associated with that development. Among them are large-scale investment 
inflows, high factor productivity, relatively low wages and a rapid growth of exports.19 
Altogether, it is possible to argue that the leadership in Beijing has succeeded in making 
China stand up and acquire sufficient weight to be taken seriously.20 Utilising the dynamics 
of the globalisation process has been a decisive factor in that achievement. 
But one year after the accession of the country to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
the PRC is still facing a number of fundamental problems. The opening of China to market 
forces caused immense economic and social changes, producing factors at both national and 
international level which are threatening the internal stability of the country as well as 
affecting the relations of the PRC with other states. Many of China’s current problems have 
been created by a system that has become an incredible engine for growth. One problem 
is internal political and economic disintegration. This process can be easily observed by 
contrasting the rapidly developing coastal areas in southern China with the poor and 
underdeveloped provinces of the hinterland. Of course, up to a certain extent even the latter 
have benefited from modernisation and globalisation but not to the same degree as, for 
instance, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Shenzhen or Guangzhou. These growing inequalities have 
resulted in an ongoing fragmentation of the country. Provinces and cities are competing 
with each other for foreign direct investment as well as in the international markets. The 
internal market of the PRC has become increasingly fragmented with intra-provincial trade 
declining and external trade increasing. The competition for scarce raw materials and 
quarrels over land, water and other resources have become evident in internal border 
conflicts.21 The gap between the prosperous east and the underdeveloped west of China is 
widening. 
The economic modernisation of the country seems to have supported political fragmentation 
too. Market-based economic growth required the decentralisation of decision-making 
power away from the central state level to provincial government officials, local party 
14 Mao died in the early hours of 9 September 1976. H. E. Salisbury, The New Emperors–Mao and Deng: A Dual 
Biography (London: HarperCollins, 1992). 
15 See for instance R. Cheetman, ‘Why We Need China to Succeed’, Asian Wall Street Journal (9 August 1995). 
16 D. Brown, ‘China Joins the Club’, The Guardian (11 December 2001). 
17 In the early 1990s, double digit numbers of GDP growth were recorded. 
18 See Cheetman, ‘Why We Need China to Succeed’. 
19 See, for instance, C. Findlay, ‘China and the Regional Economy’, in S. Harris and G. Klintworth (eds), China 
as a Great Power–Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia—Pacific Region (Melbourne: Longman, 1995), 
p. 286. 
20 J. Gittings, ‘Fragile China’, The Guardian (7 March 2002). 
21 W. Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin (Singapore: Prentice Hall, 1999), p. 254. 
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cadres and private enterprises. As a result, increasingly independent local power centres are 
forming with local officials ruling over their domains like the warlords of the 1920s. This 
seems to be tolerated by the central government on the condition that social and political 
stability is maintained and economic growth generated. Richard L. Grant mentions in this 
context that 
the use of special economic zones as a primary vehicle for marketization creates difficulties in 
the exercise of central control over the Chinese economy. Although China may not yet have 
two capitals, as some believe, with political power centered in Beijing and economic power in 
Hong Kong or Guangdong, the ability of the center to influence economic decision making in 
the provinces has eroded.22 
Unequal development is not only leading to an increasing fragmentation of the PRC. 
Internal problems are also caused by economic dislocation. Examples are the massive 
migration movements from the poor rural areas to the booming coastal cities. Over 100 
million people, mostly peasants, have not benefited from the modernisation process in the 
last few years.23  Open unemployment caused by the reduction of state-owned enterprises, 
the diminishing of job security, and the uncontrolled migration of people into urban areas 
is emerging and growing rapidly. In spring 2002, Beijing’s Labour Ministry sent a chilling 
message to millions of migrant workers who had returned home for holidays—that there 
would be no point in hurrying back into the cities, since vacancies were scarce. Gaps in 
income distribution are widening. In 2000 the average farmer’s income rose by about 2 per 
cent while urban income increased by about 7 per cent in the same year.24 The differential 
access to higher education and services combined with the natural wage dispersion in 
modern market economies will create new inequalities between rich and poor and between 
rural and urban areas which will exacerbate social tensions.25 
The problem, it appears, lies in the fact that Beijing adopted a two-tier approach to 
development—economic reform combined with political rigidity.26 However, opening to 
economic globalisation without a proper compensation mechanism for those who lose out 
in the process or are bypassed by it easily escalates into social unrest. The almost complete 
absence of efficient judicial instruments in the system to frame economic development will 
certainly cause further problems. Increasing unemployment and corruption and27 geometrically 
rising price levels for those not enjoying the anticipated benefits of the new system 
were among the factors that gave rise to a movement of domestic dissatisfaction which 
eventually turned against the Beijing government and culminated in the 1989 Tiananmen 
incident.28 
In March 2002, Zhu Rongji, prime minister of the PRC, denounced the rich–poor divide 
and serious corruption among government and party officials.29 The fact that corruption is 
recognised by Beijing’s leadership as having serious implications and reaching into the 
highest levels of state was underlined by the execution after being found guilty of 
corruption charges of Cheng Kejie, a member of the National People’s Congress and deputy 
22 R. L. Grant, ‘China and Its Asian Neighbours: Looking toward the Twenty-First Century’, Washington Quarterly, 
17,1 (1994), pp. 65, 66. 
23 See J. R Faust and J. F. Kornberg, China in World Politics (Boulder:Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 258. 
24 Gittings, ‘Fragile China’. 
25 For China’s problems see also ‘China at Fifty’, The Economist (2 October 1999), p. 23. 
26 Not to mention the uneven development of the country, which has created problems of its own. 
27 Large parts of the state and the armed forces have themselves turned toward the profit motive. Indeed, corruption 
is turning out to be a very serious problem. Economist Hu Angang has estimated that during 1999–2001 the total 
costs of corruption amounted to 14 per cent of China’s GDP per year. Gittings, ‘Fragile China’. 
28 On Tiananmen see M. Fathers and A. Higgins, Tiananmen–The Rape of Peking ( London: The Independent in association 
with Doubleday, 1989) and H. E. Salisbury, Tiananmen Diary–Thirteen Days in June (London: Unwin, 1989). 
29 J. Gittings, ‘China’s Premier Hits out at Corruption’, The Guardian (6 March 2002). 
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of Li Peng, in September 2000.30 Corruption can, indeed, be described as one of China’s 
major internal threats. In 2000, the authorities released details about a huge scandal—a US$ 
6 billion smuggling case involving more than 200 middle-ranking and senior local party and 
police officials as well as a deputy minister of public security. That was most likely not an 
isolated event. In Guangdong Province, a tax fraud case is under investigation which could 
well eclipse the smuggling case. Internal unrest is constantly caused by official wrongdoing: 
in August 2000, thousands of farmers in Jiangxi rioted against excessive and illegal taxes 
imposed by local officials.31 
China’s accession to the WTO has the potential to exacerbate an already tense situation. 
It has been estimated that entry to the WTO will deprive Chinese farmers of around 20 
million jobs. Faced with enhanced foreign competition the already badly hit state industries 
will have no alternative but to continue to lay off employees. Factory closures, growing 
unemployment and the acceptance that other countries will achieve influence in the setting 
of China’s economic policies will pose new challenges to Beijing. 
Other indicators of the globalisation process are increasing economic interdependencies 
and the development of trade, financial and political linkages across state borders. This 
might subsequently result in the formation of new territorial entities oblivious to the 
constraints of national borders. China’s economic power centres along the southern 
coastline have increasingly more in common with other major economies in Northeast Asia 
such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. A network of linkages of all sorts, especially of 
finance, trade and labour division, seems to be creating a zone of economic interdependence 
connecting these economic hotspots. In a relatively recent book on regionalism, Bjo¨rn 
Hettne distinguishes between three different types of regions with reference to their position 
in the contemporary global structure. These regions can be categorised according to their 
relative political stability and their relative degree of sustained economic dynamics. 
Accordingly, ‘Greater China’, containing coastal China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, belongs 
to the so-called intermediate regions, while the interior of China belongs to the peripheral 
zone.32 
China is facing a dilemma. Globalisation in general and economic globalisation in 
particular are driven by transnational activities and, thus, are largely outside the control of 
national authorities. Closing the country to the forces of globalisation or imposing tighter 
regulations could limit the potential economic gains and restrict the long-term prospects for 
prosperity. At the same time, however, analysis has shown that openness to the international 
political economy could undermine the domestic stability and security of the PRC.33 
Taiwan—Political Development 
The origins of the conflict between the ROC and the PRC date back to the Chinese Civil 
War. In the late 1940s, a flood of mainland refugees crossed the Taiwan Strait.34 Chiang 
Kai-shek’s Kuomintang were finally forced to retreat to Taiwan, where they were able to 
consolidate their position though losing the mainland at the same time. On 1 October 1949, 
Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the PRC and effectively created two Chinas: the PRC with its 
30 International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Strategic Survey 2000/2001’ (London: Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 180. 
31 International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Strategic Survey 2000/2001’, pp. 180, 181. 
32 B. Hettne, ‘Regionalism, Security and Development: A Comparative Perspective’, in B. Hettne, A. Inotai and O. 
Sunkel (eds), Comparing Regionalism–Implications for Global Development (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2002), 
p. 3. 
33 S. Harris, ‘China and the Pursuit of State Interests in a Globalising World’, Pacifica Review, 13,1 (2001), p. 26. 
34 In 1949 alone, approximately 1.6 million civilians and military personnel crossed the Taiwan Strait. 
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administration in Beijing and the ROC with Taipei as its capital. Both governments actively 
advocated the eventual reunification of Taiwan with the mainland although there were 
obviously substantial differences about who should rule in Beijing. 
While reunification was on the agenda of both governments during the Cold War, a 
possible invasion of the mainland from Taiwan became less and less likely. During the 
1980s, forced by changes at the international level and internal pressure, the Taipei regime 
began an internal reform programme characterised by a transformation of the Kuomintang, 
slow steps towards democratisation and the emergence of Taiwan as a de facto independent 
state. Until the mid-1980s there was little contact between the PRC and the ROC. Trade 
relations were of an indirect nature and went through Hong Kong. An important breakthrough 
occurred in 1987 when President Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law, allowed 
Taiwanese citizens to travel to the mainland and legalised the formation of political 
parties.35 Political liberalisation reflected domestic changes in Taiwan. Being one of the 
so-called ‘newly industrialised countries’ (NICs), the ROC underwent an impressive 
economic development. Over the years, the trade linkages with the mainland increased. 
According to figures released by Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, mainland trade 
grew constantly while other trade declined relatively from the late 1980s onwards.36 There 
was a demand from Taiwan’s business community to create possibilities for expansion of 
the economic linkages with the PRC. 
Taiwan’s economic development facilitated the establishment of a well-educated middle 
class who demanded more civil liberties. Opposition candidates began to coordinate their 
activities. Within the ruling party, the Kuomintang, a generational change took place. The 
old leadership was replaced by younger, highly trained (often overseas-educated) bureaucratic 
technocrats. Civilians began to take over and Taiwan became governed by a 
professional bureaucracy rather than the military. Additionally, more and more native 
Taiwanese acquired leading positions within the party structure, government, army and the 
security services. 
The democratisation and liberalisation of the ROC were caused by a mixture of 
domestic and international factors. The internal determinants have already been indicated. 
With regard to changes in the international environment of the 1980s and 1990s, the Taipei 
regime realised that it was just not enough any more simply to be an anti-communist 
government. Against the background of the Sino-US rapprochement, liberalisation and 
step-by-step democratisation became increasingly a self-interest of the ROC and the 
Kuomintang, since they provided an opportunity—perhaps the only one—to gain domestic 
and international legitimacy. Crucial milestones in this process were the presidential 
elections of 1996 and 2000. The elections of 1996 signalled, in a way, the end of the 
political transition process into the direction of fully fledged democracy. That was 
reinforced in 2000 when Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
became president of the ROC. The electoral outcome ended more than fifty years of 
Kuomintang rule. The smooth transfer of power can be regarded as passing successfully the 
ultimate test for democracy. 
The penetration of Taiwanese society by international economic, political and cultural 
forces can be regarded as an important factor in the democratisation of the ROC. Domestic 
democratisation and party politics supported the emergence of something like a Taiwanese 
identity. The notion of identity has its roots in the social needs of individuals to categorise 
35 J. B. Jacobs and L. Hong, ‘China’s Relationship with Taiwan’, in Harris and Klintworth, China as a Great Power, 
p. 25. 
36 Ministry of Economic Affairs–Board of Foreign Trade, http://www.moeaboft.gov.tw/english.htm. Accessed 25 
March 2002. 
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and classify themselves and the social group they belong to. Such a group identity fulfils 
two functions. It describes who belongs to the group while, at the same time, distinguishes 
the group from its external environment. In that way it becomes possible to identify insiders 
and outsiders and create a kind of ‘we-group’ feeling.37 
Generally speaking, identities are never fixed but are always subject to constant 
transformation and readjustment. They are dependent on time and context. Furthermore, 
identities are not absolute. Therefore, individuals can belong to more than one group at the 
same time. People can thus assume multiple identities.38 Individuals can regard themselves 
as members of a family/clan, inhabitants of a certain street/village/town/region, employees 
of a certain company while being at the same time members and representatives of a nation, 
a cultural minority, followers of a religion and citizens of a state. Hence, the context is of 
crucial importance. However, frictions might arise if different groups impose conflicting 
demands on their members.39 
The multiple identity framework is of particular interest with regard to the issue of a 
collective identity. For the construction of such an identity some form of binding element 
is needed. These links can take all sorts of shapes. Examples are a common culture, a 
common ethnic background, shared linguistic similarities, common experiences, a common 
heritage, shared norms and values. The process of political liberalisation and democratisation 
seems to have accelerated the construction of a Taiwanese national identity. As already 
mentioned, the economic development of Taiwan facilitated the formation of a well-educated 
urban middle class that increasingly asserted itself politically. This domestic pressure 
was an important element in the liberalisation of the ruling Kuomintang. Before the 1990s, 
Taiwanese identity was actively suppressed by the Kuomintang, which, originally, was 
a mainland party. However, democratisation and liberalisation caused a ‘nativisation’ of 
the party. The rise of Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese, through the party ranks to 
eventually become Taiwan’s first elected president is the best example of that. It appears 
that the cornerstones of this formative identity are the values of economic progress, 
democracy and freedom.40 In this context it deserves to be mentioned that the emergence 
of an independent Taiwanese identity is probably not such a recent phenomenon as 
suggested above. It could be argued that attempts to form an independent national identity 
have a long tradition and it is the discontinuities of history, i.e. the successive colonialisation 
and occupation by foreign regimes and by the Chinese mainland, that impeded the 
coming to maturity of a stable national identity. Following this logic, the current process 
of identity formation is only the latest wave—although with the strongest potential to 
become consolidated. 
Taiwan’s emerging identity implies a departure from the ‘one China principle’. The 
current vice president of the ROC, Annette Lu Hsiu-lien, told inquiring journalists that 
Taiwan’s history is different from that of the mainland because of the long-lasting Japanese 
occupation. Taiwan and China are close neighbours but also distant relations. And, finally, 
Taiwan is already as good as independent and sovereign. Lu Hsiu-lien also makes no secret 
of her support for Taiwan’s membership of the United Nations.41 
Another indicator of the increasing self-consciousness of the de facto state is the 
37 See G. Elwert, ‘Nationalismus und Identita¨t. U¨ ber die Bildung von Wir-Gruppen’, Ko¨lner Zeitschrift fu¨r Soziologie 
and Sozialpsychologie, 41 (1989), pp. 440–464. 
38 For an interesting analysis of the evolution of multiple identities in France and Germany see J. Schild, ‘National 
v. European Identities? French and Germans in the European Multi-level System’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 39,2 (2001), pp. 331–351. 
39 See W. Loth, ‘Identity and Statehood in the Process of European Integration’, Journal of European Integration 
History, 6,1 (2000), p. 20. 
40 See J. Kuo, ‘Building a Taiwanese National Identity’, Taipei Times (21 June 2001). 
41 ’Taiwan Takes Another Broadside from the Mainland’, The Economist, 355,8166 (2000) p. 75. 
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outcome of the 2000 presidential election. Despite Beijing’s stern warnings, menacing 
rhetoric and tactics of intimidation, electoral victory went to Chen Shui-bian, whose DPP 
had long supported the idea of Taiwanese independence. Chen Shui-bian mentioned in his 
inaugural speech ‘special historical and geographical factors’ as well as ‘a wealth of 
diversified cultural elements’. He also emphasised ‘Taiwan’s local cultures’ in contrast to 
‘the cultures of Chinese-speaking communities’. His emphasis on Taiwan seems to signify 
a new stage in the identity-building process of the island.42 There is nothing intrinsically 
wrong with that. Nor do Taiwanese and Chinese identities have to be mutually exclusive, 
as the multiple identity framework suggests. However, while previously the Taipei government 
opposed the communist regime in Beijing but did not detach itself from China’s 
future, there is now an increasing trend of opposing China itself and not just the Chinese 
Communist Party: 
Professor Szu-yin Ho… says that in the last several years there has been ‘a dramatic decline 
in the number of people who identify themselves as Chinese only, and an increase in those who 
identify themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese, or only as Taiwanese.’ People on Taiwan, 
he says, are ‘similar culturally but different in thinking’ from those on the mainland.43 
The harassing attitude of the PRC towards Taiwan only seems to reinforce the 
emergence of a separate national identity on the island. As the previous section has argued, 
the dynamics of globalisation have the intrinsic potential to cause further deterioration of 
the already rather tense domestic situation on the mainland. It is possible to argue that this 
might motivate Beijing to increase its threats towards Taipei. That in turn would only 
strengthen the emergence of a Taiwanese identity independent from the mainland, which 
would have serious long-term political, economic and social consequences for cross-strait 
relations. 
Security Implications of the Globalisation Process for Cross-Strait 
Relations 
So far the discussion has clarified two things. First, China’s internal future remains 
uncertain. Beijing’s major problems are of a domestic nature, including political, economic 
and social fragility and uneven economic development. It has been argued that forces that 
can be attributed to the globalisation process are at least partially responsible for these 
issues and certainly contain the potential to destabilise the situation even further. Second, 
at the same time, democratisation and political and social liberalisation, enhanced by the 
globalisation process, are supporting and strengthening the slow emergence of a Taiwanese 
identity that, increasingly, seems to point in the direction of a formally independent Taiwan. 
For constructivist scholars such as Alexander Wendt identity issues and the formation 
of identity are central concepts for the understanding and interpreting of international 
relations.44 These identities are subject to change through interaction and influence domestic 
and foreign security matters. According to Amitav Acharya constructivist theory interprets 
the conflict between the mainland and Taiwan as a clash of two emerging identities.45 On 
the mainland, this identity is increasingly nationalistic and sovereignty bound due to the 
42 Kuo, ‘Building a Taiwanese National Identity’. 
43 F. Ching, ‘China’s Task: Woo Taiwan’, Far Eastern Economic Review (4 November 1999). 
44 See A. Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’, International Security, 20,1 (1995) and A. Wendt, ‘Identity 
and Structural Change in International Politics’, in Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil (eds), The Return of Culture and 
Identity in IR Theory (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996). See also A. Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the 
International State’, American Political Science Review, 88,2, (1994). 
45 A. Acharya, ‘International Relations Theory and Cross-Strait Relations’, Taiwan Security Research (1999), 
http://www.taiwansecurity.org. Accessed 9 August 2002. 
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aforementioned problems while Taiwan is developing an enhanced understanding of itself 
as a distinct, democratic and independent international entity—in political, cultural and 
economic terms. Therefore, the two sides have a different outlook on and a different 
interpretation of cross-strait relations. The connection between globalisation and international 
security is to be found in the penetration of sovereign space, its effects on the 
domestic situation of a state (including the self-understanding of this state) and its 
translation into foreign policy behaviour. Consequently, the two developments mentioned 
above will determine the future of security in the Taiwan Strait. On the international level 
the impact of globalisation on PRC–POC relations can be demonstrated across the spectrum 
of international relations theory by utilising the analytical instruments offered by the 
neorealist and the neoliberalist schools of thought. 
The Impact of Globalisation on the Taiwan Strait: A Neoliberal 
Perspective 
Neoliberalism tends to provide an optimistic and forward-looking picture of the development 
of international security and globalisation. Proponents of this model focus primarily 
on the pacifying effects of globalisation: growing international trade and increasing 
interconnectedness between different economies and societies substantially increase the 
costs of armed conflict. In addition, it is often argued that these linkages support a steady 
movement towards democracy and the establishment of multilateral institutions. 
Adapted to cross-strait security the liberal/neoliberal paradigm holds to the proposition 
that globalisation carries the potential to stabilise the domestic situation of the PRC. First, 
continuing economic growth provides the government with a certain degree of legitimacy 
and could lead to eventual political liberalisation. A prime example of that is Taiwan itself. 
In fact, China these days looks a bit like the ROC in the 1970s: a one-party authoritarian 
regime with a market economy that places high priority on domestic order and stability. 
One writer has offered a good expression to characterise the PRC: ‘Market-Leninism’.46 
The prospering of the private economy is already creating a new power base outside the 
ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It fosters the formation of a new and wealthy urban 
middle class that is increasingly insisting on political participation. New means of 
communication and transport make effective censorship almost impossible. A Chinese-style 
civil society is slowly emerging and growing. Over the last couple of years a huge number 
of non-official professional, academic, business, research and other organisations have been 
created. Consumer associations are forming in many medium-sized and large cities, 
enthusiastically asserting themselves. Private entrepreneurs have actively started to lobby 
for political influence.47 The rise in the general education levels as well as pressure from 
abroad might, eventually, work in favour of political liberalisation. However, continuing 
economic growth alone will not be sufficient. It has to be accompanied by the establishment 
of an efficient judicial system and working compensatory mechanisms and social safety 
networks. 
A stable and politically reformed China will then have a different foreign policy 
outlook. This argument is based on the assumption that the opportunity costs of interdependence 
are low while the costs of an aggressive foreign policy are prohibitively high. The 
costs of conflict result from the disruption to markets and investment flows. Economic 
relations and interdependencies with other states and the world economy make China more 
vulnerable to such dislocations while at the same time fostering habits of communication 
46 N. D. Kristof and S. Wudunn, China Wakes–The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power (London: Nicholas Brealy, 1994). 
47 Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin, p. 304. 
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and compromise.48 The incentives for conflict are furthermore lowered, since the open 
international economy allows relatively free access to other markets. Resources and finance 
can be obtained at less cost than by securing spheres of influence with the help of military 
operations. Furthermore, globalisation empowers a variety of different groups within state 
and society which have a more pragmatic view of foreign policy. 
The prospect of an economically developed and politically liberalised mainland 
provides the opportunity for a clear improvement of cross-strait relations. Taipei would find it 
far easier to communicate with a democratically elected government in Beijing. Increasing 
economic exchange across the Taiwan Strait will benefit both sides and reduce the risk of 
conflict. Most crucially, the identity of the ROC would not have to be in opposition to 
mainland China—assuming that Taiwan’s emerging identity is based on economic progress 
and on the values of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’. Taiwan’s identity-building process does 
not have to be reversed. The multiple identity framework makes it possible to be Chinese 
and Taiwanese at the same time. Eventually, reunification becomes possible. Being part of 
a democratic and developed PRC certainly would be in the interest of Taiwan’s business 
community since access to the Chinese market would be easier and the transaction costs for 
Taiwan–China trade would be reduced. Furthermore, such a move would enhance Taipei’s 
standing in the international community. Taiwanese companies would be enabled to trade 
on their own terms without being affected by the weak international position of the ROC. 
It makes sense to think about the reunification as a process in two stages: an economic and 
monetary union with a common market would provide the groundwork, which might, 
eventually, be followed by a full political union of the ROC and the PRC. 
The Impact of Globalisation on the Taiwan Strait: A Neorealist 
Perspective 
Realism offers a rather less optimistic picture. Realists and neorealists do not accept the 
validity of the optimistic liberal/neoliberal argument. This school is more concerned with 
the distribution of capabilities, balances-of-power and strategic equilibria. Accordingly, it 
focuses more on the destabilising effects of the globalisation process. The problems of 
China’s fragile domestic system have already been mentioned. Globalisation makes the 
PRC more vulnerable to outside shocks such as the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. 
Although China escaped relatively unharmed the crisis demonstrated that social dissatisfaction 
triggered off by such an event can lead to internal upheaval and social unrest, 
subsequently leading to an open challenge to the ruling regime.49 Beijing’s leadership is 
worried about such possibilities. That might explain the drastic crackdown and the policy 
of zero tolerance towards the Falun Gong movement. While neither the movement nor the 
protests following the crackdown represent a threat to the government, they signal the 
diminishing ability of the Beijing regime to command public obedience. It would be too 
much to characterise the Falun Gong sect as a civil protest movement, but it has evoked 
lingering sympathy not only among the general public but even within the CCP and the 
security services.50 
A tense domestic and unstable domestic situation would find expression in China’s 
foreign relations. Failing increasingly to legitimise its leadership through economic prosperity 
and losing domestic support, the Beijing government would be prone to claim 
48 B. Buzan and G. Segal, ‘Rethinking Asian Security’, Survival, 36,2 (1994), p. 11. 
49 The fall of Suharto in Indonesia offers the best example of that. 
50 To the Communist Party’s problem with domestic religious movements, especially with the Falun Gong, see G. 
C. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (London: Century, 2001), p. 17. 
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legitimacy through nationalist claims and a more aggressive foreign policy. Jiang Zemin’s 
approach to governance seems to favour Maoist-style ‘mass movements’ that foster 
nationalist tendencies.51 There are many signs that Jiang’s vision of China’s future 
advocates nationalist values combined with a tight law-and-order regime.52 Nationalism 
could be an effective instrument in holding China together. As a result, domestic dissatisfaction 
could be easily turned against external targets—such as the renegade province of 
Taiwan. At the same time, this kind of development on the mainland would reinforce the 
emerging identity of the ROC in contrast to China.53 Conflict and tensions and a general 
deterioration of security across the Taiwan Strait are almost pre-programmed under such a 
scenario. 
But even if we assume China will not be affected by an international economic crisis 
and will be able to generate sufficient rates of economic growth, eventually being able to 
stabilise its domestic situation, the realist/neorealist school does not argue for a necessary 
improvement of security in the Taiwan Strait. Many Chinese equate economic growth with 
national power. Growth allows the PRC to build up its armed forces and to project itself 
as a regional power.54 China’s analysts are very much influenced by traditional balance-ofpower 
thinking.55 The country is not satisfied with the current status quo and China’s 
economic growth will provide it with the necessary means for a more assertive foreign 
policy. The realist framework sees China’s economic potential, its inherent strength, its 
view of itself and its eagerness to redeem a century of humiliations as important factors 
behind China’s foreign policy behaviour. 
China’s military budget has risen significantly at a time when external threats are low.56 
Official sources show a 17.1 per cent rise of the military budget in 2001, a figure much 
higher than the overall economic growth of the country.57 The modernisation programme of 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) put particular emphasis on the acquisition of weapon 
technologies with the capability for long-range power projection.58 A growing economic 
base will increase the opportunities for Beijing to establish greater control over its external 
surroundings while at the same time the costs for doing so are decreasing.59 As a great 
power, China will be more inclined to force its will upon others. Beijing is already very 
reluctant to join binding multilateral security agreements.60 Based on the realist framework 
the incentives for limited expansionism would be irresistible. Beijing still believes that 
military operations are useful in international politics; it doubts the efficacy of multilateral 
cooperation and in fact prefers domination. 
The analysis draws a picture of a China which challenges the current status quo in the 
region, with a serious deterioration of relations with Taiwan as one of the results. The 
51 Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin, p. 3. 
52 B. Gilley, ‘Jiang’s Turn Tempts Fate’, Far Eastern Economic Review (30 August 2001). 
53 The outcome of the 2000 presidential election in the ROC is only one example of the counterproductivity of 
Beijing’s policy of threats and intimidation towards Taiwan. 
54 ’China Opens up’, The Economist (20 November 1999), p. 13. 
55 See J. T. Christensen, ‘Chinese Realpolitik’, Foreign Affairs, 75,5 (1996), p. 37. 
56 J. Page, ‘China Said Set to Announce More Military Spending’, Reuters (4 March 2002), http://taiwansecurity.org/ 
Reu/2002/Reuters-030402.htm. Accessed 25 April 2002. 
57 See Chang, The Coming Collapse of China, p. 38. 
58 On China’s military modernisation see D. Roy, ‘The “China Threat Issue” ’, Asian Survey, 36,8 (1996), p. 759; 
N. D. Kristof, ‘The Rise of China’, Foreign Affairs, 72,5 (1993), p. 65; D. B. Denoon and W. Frieman, ‘China’s 
Security Strategy–The View from Beijing, ASEAN and Washington’, Asian Survey, 36,4 (1996), p. 424; and R. 
Bernstein and R. B. Munro, ‘The Coming Conflict with America’, Foreign Affairs, 76,2 (1997), p. 24. See also 
B. Gertz, ‘China Assembles Missiles Near Coast Facing Taiwan’, Washington Times (2 April 2002). 
59 D. Roy, ‘Hegemon on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East Asian Security’, International Security, 19,1 (1994), 
p. 161. 
60 G. Segal, ‘Tying China into the International System’, Survival, 37,2 (1995), p. 60 and M. B. Wallerstein, ‘China 
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neoliberalist model focuses on political liberalisation, which, in a way, is supported by 
forces generally ascribed to the globalisation process. However, even a democratically 
elected government would have difficulties with giving up the sovereignty claims on 
Taiwan without running into trouble at home. Furthermore, China does not necessarily have 
to take the ‘Taiwan road’. The ‘Singapore model’ is also possible: a brilliantly managed 
market economy without the ballast of Western political standards which satisfies Beijing’s 
desire for order and stability. It could also develop into a second Indonesia, which, 
until recently (under Suharto), enjoyed industrial growth combined with one-party rule. 
The Suharto regime, like the CCP, preferred using force to suppress dissidents or to 
massacre independence movements when the authority of its leadership was challenged. 
There is already some evidence for the transformation of the CCP into the right-wing 
authoritarianism of a Suharto.61 
A strong China is likely to become more impatient with the ROC. It will renew its 
threats to use force to bring reunification about on Beijing’s terms. The danger with 
applying the realist model too literally lies in the fact that it can become something like a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. Taipei would realise that its long-term strategy to foster development 
and democratisation in China is not paying off. A fully developed China would be 
much more difficult to deal with, bearing in mind that Beijing never has rejected military 
force as a means of resolving the issue. Taiwan would run out of time. Hence it would 
probably increase its efforts to achieve formal independence, trying to become a member 
of the United Nations and other governmental and non-governmental organisations. The 
ROC would also be well aware of Sino-US relations. Under such conditions, it would be 
in Taiwan’s best interest to declare de jure independence before China is fully developed. 
At first glance that move seems to be irrational. However, if we look a little bit more closely 
it turns out to be the only rational choice if the ROC intends to survive as a state. First, 
while China is midway in its development process, Taipei still has the capabilities to hold 
off sufficiently any attempted invasion from the mainland. The ROC simply cannot afford 
to wait until China becomes too strong to be contained—or until the United States is too 
weak to contain China or no longer sees its interest in protecting Taiwan. Although a 
declaration of Taiwan’s independence in the near future would be rather inconvenient for 
Washington, the United States would be trapped by its own rhetoric.62 That might have been 
part of the rationale that motivated the former president of the ROC, Lee Teng-hui, to 
mention in an interview that the relations between the mainland and Taiwan should be 
conducted on a ‘special state-to-state’ basis, although it inevitably brought cross-strait 
relations to a dangerous point.63 
If Taiwan declared formal independence, Beijing would have no choice but to act. Its 
response could be anything from naval blockades to ballistic missile attacks. Even invasion 
attempts are not impossible, although rather unlikely given the current development status 
of the PLA. Whatever measures the PRC might employ in such a scenario, the security 
situation of the Taiwan Strait and the whole of the Asia Pacific would seriously deteriorate. 
A recent white paper states, 
61 Gilley, ‘Jiang’s Turn Tempts Fate’. 
62 President Bush declared at Beijing’s Qinghua University that he was prepared to defend Taiwan if it were to be 
attacked by the mainland. That marks a change from the attitude of former US administrations towards the issue. 
No previous US president has mentioned the commitments of the Taiwan Relations Act while visiting China. (J. 
Gittings, ‘Bush Tells China that He Will Defend Taiwan’, The Guardian [23 February 2002].) However, it has 
to be remarked that it is official US policy not to support Taiwanese independence. That was underlined at the 
2002 Jiang—Bush summit, where President Bush clearly expressed US opposition to Taiwan independence and 
his adherence to the one-China policy. See C. Cockel, ‘No Surprises for Taiwan from Bush—Jiang Summit’, China 
Post (27 October 2002). 
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if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any 
name… then the Chinese government will have no choice but to adopt all drastic measures 
possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
and achieve the great cause of reunification.64 To summarise, the realist outlook on Sino- 
Taiwanese relations provides a rather negative perspective on the effects of globalisation on 
cross-strait security, with the possibilities of increasing competition between the two states, 
mounting threats, enhanced intimidation and increasing political pressure on Taiwan from the 
mainland. 
Constructivism and Globalisation in the Taiwan Straits 
Both the neoliberal and the neorealist paradigms have been considered because they 
represent alternative and very different lenses of looking at and explaining international 
events and processes. They represent opposite ends of the theoretical spectrum of international 
relations. They have their own intrinsic weaknesses and draw two very different 
conclusions regarding the globalisation process and its implications across the Taiwan 
Straits. In both instances, however, the impact of globalisation plays a crucial role in the 
development of the security relations between the two countries countries. 
The third major paradigm of contemporary international relations theory is social 
constructivism. The characteristics of constructivism and its relevance for the interpretation 
of PRC–ROC relations have already been mentioned above. Whereas neorealism and 
neoliberalism are based on rational choice theory and take the identities and interests of 
actors as given, constructivist theories start from the presumption that international 
structures are social constructs. Identities and interests of international actors are then 
formed through interactions and processes (such as the globalisation process) and not prior 
to them. In applying a constructivist way of thinking to the dynamics of the globalisation 
process and international security in the Taiwan Strait, emphasis will be placed on the 
impact of globalisation on identity formation and reshaping in the PRC and the ROC. This 
has already been elaborated in sufficient detail. On the mainland globalisation seems to 
pronounce an intensely nationalist, centralised and sovereignty-bound identity that stresses 
reunification with Taiwan as a crucial part of its self-perception. On Taiwan, on other hand, 
globalisation has supported the development of a democratic state that is becoming 
increasingly aware of its own distinct national identity. It is imperative to understand that 
constructivism can be pessimistic as well as optimistic regarding the effects of globalisation 
on cross-strait security. While China is opening its doors to the forces of the globalisation 
process and is becoming a member of the international political economy, Taiwan 
represents an important economic asset to Beijing. Adherence to international norms and 
socialisation processes might change Beijing’s outlook on cross-strait relations. The same 
applies for Taiwan. However, an economic shock could easily exacerbate an already rather 
tense situation. It is the stress on factors such as identities which makes constructivism an 
interesting paradigm for the study of globalisation and security. 
Conclusion 
The paper has outlined the connections between the globalisation process and its implications 
for international security. Globalisation leads to an increasing penetration of sovereign 
space by external forces and therefore challenges traditional modes of governance. As a 
result, domestic and international affairs are becoming increasingly intertwined and so are 
64 Information Office of the State Council, ‘China’s National Defense in 2000’, White Paper, http://english. 
peopledaily.com.cn/features/Ndpaper/nd.html. Accessed 9 April 2002. 
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domestic and foreign policy measures. In addition, globalisation supports the diversification 
of security threats and the creation of new security actors and enhances the pronouncement 
of identity. Transnational political, social and economic activities have the intrinsic 
potential to threaten the internal stability of a nation-state, which in turn will affect the 
foreign policy approach of its national government. 
In applying this framework to the situation in the Taiwan Strait the analysis has 
concluded that two features are among the most crucial determinants for the future relations 
of the PRC and the ROC. These are the domestic stability of China and the development 
of a Taiwanese political identity. Globalisation has a great impact on the internal circumstances 
of the PRC as well as on the identity construction process in Taiwan and, therefore, 
on the security of the Taiwan Strait. Study of the Sino-Taiwanese conflict has demonstrated 
that globalisation is a determining factor in international security across the theoretical 
divide of international relations. The scenarios described above indicate that globalisation 
forces carry the potential for either improvement and eventual reunification, or a serious 
deterioration and even armed struggle. However, so far no clear direction is identifiable. 
Regardless of which school of thought is being applied, globalisation has a decisive impact 
on Sino-Taiwanese relations and on the security of the Taiwan Strait. The theoretical 
frameworks were applied for demonstrative purposes only. The reality of international 
relations is far more complicated than any of these paradigms can comprehend. Although 
there is much evidence supporting the realist/neorealist argument, China’s restrained 
response to the outcome of the 2000 presidential elections in the ROC suggests that the 
more pragmatic forces in Beijing remain firmly in control of the PRC’s external relations 
despite increasingly public expressions of virulent nationalism.65 Nevertheless, the Beijing 
administration cannot afford to go soft on the Taiwan issue. This could explain the repeated 
threats towards the island. It is, however, important not to over-emphasise the mainland 
rhetoric. Researchers such as Gary Klintworth argue in a convincing manner that China has 
no real intentions of going to war with Taiwan.66 In terms of domestic and international 
security much depends on other factors such as the forthcoming leadership change of the 
CCP. It is in connection with these other factors that the forces of globalisation will exert 
their full influence upon cross-strait relations. 
65 International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Strategic Survey 2000/2001’, p. 172. 
66 G. Klintworth, ‘China, Taiwan and the United States’, Pacifica Review, 13,1 (2001), p. 55. 
 
